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Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Tamara Holden, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 920709-CA 
F I L E D 
( J a n u a r y 27 , 1993) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: William H. Babbel, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
Jan Graham and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Billings (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
William H. Babbel, appeals from the trial court's denial of 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm. 
Babbel was convicted, after a trial by jury, of two counts 
of aggravated sexual assault, and one count of aggravated 
kidnapping. Babbel was sentenced to a term of five years to life 
for the first count of aggravated assault, a concurrent term of 
five years to life for the aggravated kidnapping, and a 
consecutive term of five years to life for the second count of 
aggravated sexual assault. Babbel appealed the convictions, 
claiming the trial court should have excluded evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrant because the warrant was issued without 
probable cause. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the convictions 
but ruled that sentencing was improper and remanded for 
resentencing. State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989). 
On remand, the court resentenced petitioner to three concurrent 
minimum mandatory terms of ten years to life. On appeal the 
sentences were affirmed. 
In January of 1991, Babbel filed his first petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, claiming counsel failed to inform him that 
the supreme court could vacate the sentence and allow the trial 
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus is not a 
substitute for and cannot be used to perform the function of 
regular appellate review, Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 
1104 (Utah 1983). However, a conviction may nevertheless be 
challenged by collateral attack in unusual circumstances or upon 
a showing of good cause shown.1. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P. 2d 1029, 
1035 (Utah 1989). "The unusual circumstances test was intended 
to assure fundamental fairness and to require reexamination of a 
conviction on habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged error 
was such that it would be 'unconscionable not to reexamine' . . . 
and thereby to assure that 'substantial justice [was] done' 
. . . ." Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1115 (quoting Martinez v. Smith, 
602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). Further, lf[t]he prior 
adjudication of a habeas petition does not bar the adjudication 
of a subsequent petition as a matter of res judicata, but Rule 
65B(i)(4) does require a showing of good cause for filing a 
successive writ.11 id. at 1036-37. "Frivolous claims, once-
litigated claims with no showing of unusual circumstances or good 
cause, and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons should 
be summarily denied. In a successive petition, the burden is on 
the petitioner "to show that the ends of justice would be served 
by permitting the redetermination of the ground." Id. 
Babbel essentially claims that his petition should not have 
been dismissed as successive because there are "unusual 
circumstances." Specifically, Babbel claims that the following 
constitute unusual circumstances: the conviction was obtained 
through the use of illegally seized evidence, Officer Cazier 
obtained the warrant illegally, Officer Cazier committed perjury 
to obtain the search warrant and to get evidence admitted, trial 
counsel was ineffective, and appellate counsel was ineffective. 
We first consider whether the allegation that the conviction 
was obtained through the use of illegally seized evidence 
constitutes "unusual circumstances." The Utah Supreme Court 
addressed Babbel's claim regarding whether the evidence should 
have been suppressed in his first appeal and concluded that the 
trial court was justified in denying the motion to suppress. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989). Babbel has not shown good 
cause or unusual circumstances that warrant reconsideration of 
that issue. 
Babbel also claims he was unable to raise certain claims in 
his first petition because he did not have the transcripts and 
documents to prove the claims. Specifically, he did not have the 
documents to prove that Officer Ca-zier obtained the warrant 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has not clarified whether unusual 
circumstances and good cause are synonymous. However, one 
justice has stated that the terms are comparable. Dunn v. Cook, 
791 P.2d 873, 879 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Je hav£ examined the^emaining issues raised -and find them 
to/he without merit'. S / 
w2z 
*K£gnaf W. Garf f, Judg 
R u s s e l l W. Bench, Jucftje" 
J u d i t h M. B i l l i n g s , Judge 
Cc #/c^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BABBEL, WILLIAM H 
VS 
HOLDEN, M TAMARA 







CASE NUMBER 920903226 HC 
DATE 08/03/92 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND PURSUANT TO THE ORAL 
ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS HELD JULY 31, 1992, 
THE COURT HAVING TAKEN THE MATTER OF ITS DECISION UNDER 
ADVISEMENT, RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (TREATED AS SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT) IS GRANTED FOR THE REASONS STATED IN THE MEMORANDA 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF. 
2. COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE 
ORDER. 
lecem 
WILLIAM H. 5ABBEL 
Pro Se 
P.O. Pox 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
000O000 
WILLIAM H. BABBEL, 
Appellant, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SUMMARY REVERSAL 
vs. : 
TAMARA HOLDEN, : 
Appeallee. : Case No. . 
000O000 
COKES NOV: the appellant, William H. Babbel, and pursuant to 
the Rules of this Court and in Support of the Motion for Summary 
Reversal of the District Court's Order, submits the following 
Memorandum, 
FACTS 
On 5 June 1992, the appellant filed a petition for habeas 
corpus relief in the Third Judicial District Court, J. Dennis 
Frederick, Jud;;e, presiding. The petition was filed in Third District 
Court as a result of an Order in the United States District Court, 
requiring the appellant to return ta State Court and exaust issues 
not previously exausted. The petition filed in Third District Court 
raised eight issues. 
1
. The evidence used at trial was gained through a warrant wnich 
was obtained by the use of false information in the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant, given by Detective Larry Cazier, 
2. Detective Larry Cazier perjured himself during the supression 
hearing to ascertain that the illegally seized evidence would be 
admitted into evidence. 
3. ^ he appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel during 
the supression hearing, at trial and on appeal. 
k. That the appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel 
on his second appeal in this Court. 
5» That the Deputy County Attorney withheld Detective Cazierfs notes 
because he knew that they would show the detective was never told 
about a specific piece of evidence, which was admitted into evidence. 
6. That the initial entry onto the appellants property by Det. Cazier 
was illegal and gained through threats and lies. 
7. That the seizure of a "55 M.P.H. Sucks Button" was in violation 
of the appellants Fourth Amendment Rights. 
8. That the trial Court abused it's discretion in refusing to consider 
evidence in mitigation when it sentenced the appellant to three 
terms of ten years to life, pursuant to this Court's order in 
Pabbel I, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989). 
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss in part stating that 
the appellant had had the opportunity to address these issues in 
a previous petition filed in Third District Court. After briefing 
the issues and having oral arguments, Judge Frederick dismissed 
the petition, (See order attached to Docketing Statement) 
Subsequently, this appeal was taken, 
WHY THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL 
In the petition for habeas corpus relief filed in Third 
District Court, the appellant articulated sufficient facts, supported 
by documentation, which show that there was a fundamental unfairness 
on the part of the State in obtaining the conviction in this matter; 
and that counsels' repeated failure to raise issues or supply the 
appellant with documents with which to raise the issues himself, 
give rise to sufficient "unusual circumstances" to warrant a second 
petition for habeas corpus relief. (See petition attached as Exhibit 
A to this Motion) 
While the petition raises several claims, they can be put into 
four catagories; 
1. ^ hat Det. Cazier used false information to gain a search 
warrant, thus making his search illegal; 
2. That Cazier compounded this false information by cornmiting 
perjury during the supression hearing, thus making sure that the 
illegally seized evidence was admitted; 
3. That the appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel 
at various stages of this case, to include; Brooke Wells failure 
to show that Cazier used false information in gaining the warrant, 
that the Detective lied during tne supression hearing, that Ms, 
Wells failed to compel production of supposed notes in the 
possession of :)et. Cazier, and that Ms. .veils refused to raise 
issues on appeal that the appellant wanted raised, further that 
Joan Watt refused to raise issues on appeal that the appellant 
specifically wanted raised, or supply the appellant with the necessary 
documents to raise the issues himself. 
4. And, that Judge Scott Daniels abused his discretion in 
refusing to consider evidence in mitigation prior to imposing three 
ten year to life terms of imprisonment. 
While the issues of Detective Cazier obtaining a warrant illegally 
and commiting perjury, and Ms. Wells ineffectiveness were known to 
the appellant at the time of the filing of the first petition, the 
appellant could not have brought those issues without the necessary 
documents, and transcripts with which to prove the allegations. 
Ms. Wells supplied the respondent with an affidavit, which was 
attached to the motion to dismiss the petition. In that affidavit 
Ms. Wells states that the appellant had access to the transcripts 
to the proceedings, prior to trial, to include the supression hearing 
transcripts. Ms. Wells fails to note that the supression hearing 
transcripts were not transcribed until two months after the trial 
had ended. See Ms. Wells affidavit attacned as Exhibit B to this 
Motion, and the Certificate of Susan S. Sprouse, certifying that 
the transcripts were not produced until 30 December 1985. 
4. 
Ms. Wells affidavit also clearly states that she did not raise 
issues that the appellant wanted raised* Ms. ".veils includes letters 
to her and Jeffrey Hunt, the intern that wrote the brief, which 
show the specific allegations that the appellant wanted raised. 
Ms. Wells affidavit clearly shows that she did not raise issues 
that the appellant wanted raised. This admission falls squarely 
within the language the Utah Court of Appeals used in Wagstaff v. 
Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah App. 1990) "On direct appeal, 
Wagstaffs appointed counsel failed to raise the representation 
argument, contrary to Wagstaff1s expressed desire. This places the 
case squarely within the language of Chess v. Smith and constitutes 
and obvious injustice justifying habeas corpus relief.fl Accord 
Jensen v. leland, 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1989). See also Chess v. 
Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343-44 (Utah 1980). 
This Court addressed the "unusual circumstances test" in Hurst v. 
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989), stating in part; that, "a 
conviction may nevertheless be challenged by collateral attack in 
"unusual circumstances", that is where an obvious injustice or a 
substantial denial of a constitutional right has occured, irrespective 
of whether an appeal has been taken." 
Both Ms. Wells and Ms. Watt refused to raise issues on appeal that 
the appellant wanted raised. Ms. Wells states that she did not 
raise those issues, and the respondent has never argued that Ms. 
Watt refused to raise issues the appellant wanted raised. These 
two allegations satisfy the unusual circumstances test that was 
developed by this Court. 
Further, the allegations of Detective Cazier using false information 
in the affidavit, and commiting perjury during the supression hearing 
were suoported by the record. This allegation was not made in the 
hopes of being able to Drove it, it was made and substantiated with 
the record. "Does the use of perjured testimony and illegally seized 
evidence to gain a conviction rise to a level of a denial of a right 
.guaranteed constitutional right ? The appellant believes that it 
ioes indeed* 
Attached to this yemorandum (as Exhibit D) is a copy of the affidavit 
Cazier furnished to Judge burton in support of the warrant. In that 
affidavit Cazier states that Karen Sine described the truck as having 
a cracked windshield, drink holders on the dash, and orange seat 
covers* Cazier also testified to this during the supression hearing. 
See Exhibit E to this Memorandum. But during trial it came out, thru 
cross examination that Not only did Karen Sine describe the truck 
as having white seats, but that the truck Cazier saw in the appellants 
driveway did not have drink holders in it. After removing these two 
items from the warrant, because they did not exist at the time the 
detective saw the truck, it leaves a brown Chevrolet truck with a 
cracked windshield and a 55 Sucks button on the dash. The State did 
not ever establish that the windshield was cracked. And the button 
which has been the object of review, was never described to the 
detective in any report. He claimedthat it only existed in his 
hand written notes, ?.ut both he and the State refused to make those 
notc-'available to the appellant or his counsel. The button was only 
recalled by Karen Sine on the day of trial after prompting by the 
ietective. See Exhibit F to this I emorandum. 
Both testimony by the detective and photos taken oy tne Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs* Office on the day of the search establish that 
the seats were not white as described by the victim, Laren Sine, 
that there were no drink holders on the dash, and that the wind-
shield was not cracked. See Exhibit G to this Memorandum. In TT, 
221-22-23-24, Cazier's own reports indicate that he believed that 
the truck he was looking for had white seats, in fact, the detective 
was looking for a light colored truck, as is evidenced by his own 
testimony at trial. See Exhibit H to this Memorandum. Ms. Sine's 
testimony establishes that there were no drink holders on the dash 
of the truck on the day Cazier saw it. See Exhibit I to this 
Memorandum. Additionally, Ms. Sine never identified the truck itself. 
See Exhibit J to this Memorandum. 
noth the record and Caziers1 reports show, very clearly, that the 
detective used false information to gain the warrant, and then 
perjured himself to make sure that the illegally seized evidence 
was admitted. 
The appellant believes that these facts give rise to a violation 
of the due process clause of both the Utah Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Ms. Wells had all the documents which established that Cazier used 
false information to gain the warrant, and that he lied during the 
supression hearing. Additionally she should have raised this as an 
issue on appeal, but refused. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 692 (1983), the Court neld that, "except for counsel's un-
professional errors, the result of the proceeeing would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to 
undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial." Counsel 
failed to use information known to her to show that Cazier lied in 
the affidavit and during the supression hearing. Had she done so, 
the result of the trial would probably have been different* 
Likewise, had Ms. Wells shown, on appeal, that the detective used 
false information, and perjury to gain evidence, the decision in 
State v. ^ abbel, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989), might have been just as 
different. In Babbel I this Court held; "Although we conclude that 
the magistrate did not err in finding tne affidavit sufficient, we 
must observe that this is a close question. If the affidavit were 
more vague, we might well reach the opposite conclusion." See foot-
note 3. Justice Zimmerman, for the Court, stated; We acknowledge 
that the affidavit is ambiguous in its use of the word "match", but 
conclude that it was within the magistrates discretion to construe 
Cazier1s statement that 3abbel(l)!s (sic) truck matched the des-
cription to mean that the truck matched with respect to those 
characteristics expressly described in the affidavit. The record 
clearly shows that the affidavit contained false information. With 
that false information, there were insufficient facts to sustain 
probable cause to issue the warrant. The only other paragraph that 
made reference to the appellant was removed from the affidavit by 
stipulation of the parties. See Babpel I, 992, footnote 2. 
In ^ ranks v. Oeleware, 438 U.J. 154 (1978), the Court held; "when 
determining whether misstatements contained in an affidavit in 
support of a search warrant should invalidate the warrant, the 
court must determine whethter any misstatement was material, that 
is (1) whether it was critical to a finding of prooable cause, (2) 
whether it was deliberately made, and, (3) wnether without the 
information probable cause would not have been established.11 
In the instant matter it is obvious that the description given by 
Karen oine was crucial to a finding of probable cause. Without 
that description there would have been no information on which to 
issue the warrant. When Cazier was confronted with his reports and 
numerous photos and witness statements, he admitted that the truck 
did not match in at least three respects he had articulated in his 
affidavit in support of the warrant. That left a brown Chevrolet 
pickun. Which was not enough to establish probable cause. Were these 
misstatements made deliberately. The appellant believes that they 
were. Cazier made the same statements numerous times. But when, and 
only wnen, he was confronted with his reports, photos, and the 
witness statements he recorded, did he tell the truth. This Court 
sustained the warrant because the detective used the descriptions 
he used. But, if this Court had known that the information was 
false, had Brooke Wells brought to this Court's attention that the 
information was false, would it have ruled as it did. The appellant 
does not believe so. 
Ms. V/ells knew that the information in the affidavit was incorrect. 
She was supplied with copies of the reports and statements in June 
of 1985. A full two months before the supression nearing. She was 
told numerous times by the appellant that the truck did not match 
the description in the affidavit. Still she refused to raise the 
issue before Judge 3aniels. After numerous phone calls and letters, 
after the trial, she refused to raise the issue on appeal. Ms. V/ells 
conduct falls with the meaning of unusual circumstances articulated 
by this Court. Further, the conduct of Ms. Watt refusing to raise 
issues of Ms. Wells ineffective assistance on appeal meet the same 
test. When the appellant filed his appeal in 3abbe 1 II he requested 
that counsel be appointed. He specifically requested that neither 
Ms. Wells, nor anyone be appointed from the Legal Defenders Assoc, 
because of ineffectiveness of counsel claims. Ms. Watt was appointed 
anyway. Once appointed, she refused to raise issues the appellant 
wanted raised. See Exhibit K, letter to Brooke Wells, and Exhibit 
L, motion for appointment of counsel, to this Memorandum. After Ms. 
Watt refused to raise these issues, but before she withdrew as 
counsel, the appellant asked Ms. Watt for copies of the police 
reports, witness statements ect. The appellant wanted to raise these 
issue in the first petition. Ms. Watt indicated that she could not 
produce them for several months. Which was four months after the 
initial petition was already dismissed. 
The appellant has tried to raise these issues on numerous occaisons, 
but has been precluded by counsels refusal to raise them or to 
sunnly the appellant with documents to raise tnem himself. The 
appellant has never tried to delay the process or abuse the writ. 
The appellant only now raised the issues because he had tne documents 
to do so. during the initial filing of the first petition, the 
appellant contacted Mr. Coeffrey Butler of this Court, to try to 
get copies of the transcripts, but was told that the State had 
them and that they were not available. The appellant believes that 
Justice Jurham took notice of this fact during oral arguments in 
Tabbel II. ^ he appellant never had all of the transcripts or documents 
with which to articulate or prove the allegations in this petition 
until August of 1991. Two months after the initial petition had 
been dismissed. 
Do the facts articulated in the petition meet the unusual 
circumstances test developed by this Court ? The appellant believes 
that they do. In Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035, this Court 
held; ,f this Court has frequently addressed and resolved the merits 
of claims asserted in petitions for writs of habeas corpus even 
though the issues raised were' known or should have been Known at 
the time of conviction or appeal. It follows, and is has long been 
our law, that a procedural default is not always determinative of a 
collqteral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial 
was not conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony 
with constitutional standards.'1 The Court also stated that any 
number of petitions could be sought for good cause shown. In defining 
good cause, the Court stated, ,? A showing of good cause that 
justifies the filing of a successive claim may be established by 
showing, (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction, 
and (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or 
abuse the writ." 
The claims as to Ks. .Veils refusal to raise issues on appeal fall 
within the language of "obvious injustice" articluated in Wagstaff, 
Chess, and Jensen. These cases also apply to the claims of Ms. Watts 
refusal. The claims of false information and perjury by _)et. Cazier 
also fall with the language of obvious injustice, or unusual cir-
cumstances, or good cause as are articulated in Dunn v. Cook, and 
Hurst v. Cook. Supra. 
The United States Supreme Court visited the issue of perjured testimony 
in Brady"v".~Mary 1 and, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963), the Court stated; "if 
a state has contrived a conviction . . . through a deliberate 
deception of the court . . . by the presentation of testimony 
known to be perjured . . . such a contrivance by the state to 
procure a conviction of a defendant is as inconsistent with the 
rudimentry demands of justice as is obtaining of a like result by 
intimidation." Citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, and Pyle v. 
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213. The went on to say; "These allegations 
sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the 
federal constitution and, if proven would entitle petitioner to 
release from his present custody." 
Cazier1s perjury constitutes a substantial and prejudicial denial 
12. 
of a constitutional right justifying riaoeas corpus relief. 
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10 L.ed.2d 143, the Court 
stated; ,fthe princinle of res judicata is inapplicable in habeas 
cornus proceedings, Conventional notions of finality have no place 
where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional 
rights is alleged. This Court, in Hurst stated that neither 
"collateral estoppel nor issue preclusion is an absolute defense 
in habeas corpus proceeding." And in )unn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 
(Utah 1990), this Court again stated; "The doctrines of waiver and 
res judicata do not stand as an unyeilding bar to the litigation 
of claims that either once were or could have been litigated in 
a prior proceeding. The policy of finality certainly does have a 
high nlace in our hierarchy of judicial values, but that policy 
is not so compelling as to be more important than the vindication 
of a persons constitutional right to a fair trial." Justice Stewart 
went on to say, "Howsoever desirable it may be to adhere to the rules, 
the law should not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice 
has resulted the defendant should be without a remedy." 
The appellant in this matter has shown that there is sufficient 
good cause to warrant habeas corpus review of his claims. His counsel 
has refused to raise issues on appeal, and during proceedings prior 
trial, the investigating detective used false information to gain 
a search warrant, and perjured himself to insure that evidence he 
seized was admitted, and the trial court imposed sentence while 
refusing to consider evidence in mitigation. 
Judge Frederick erred in dismissing all the claims. Good cause 
was shown. Good cause within the meaning of this Courtfs prior 
decisions. The claims as to Joan Watt and Judge Janiels should 
not have been dismissed because those claims came after the initial 
petition had been dismissed. Joan Watt was still counsel of record 
before this Court, and the issue of Judge Janiels was still before 
this Court on a petition for re-hearing. Which was not denied until 
two months after the initial petition was dismissed. 
The claims in this petition warranted an evidentiary hearing, 
and, if proven warranted habeas corpus relief. The appellant has 
shown good cause, and that unusual circumstances exist. Judge Frederick 
erred in granting summary judgement, and ruling that the petition 
was frivilous. 
Justice Louis 0. Brandeis once stated that, "Crime is contagious, 
if the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the 
law. To declare that in the administration of criminal law, the end 
justifies the means, to declare that the government may commit crimes 
in order to secure a conviction of a private criminal, would be 
to bring terrible retribution.'1 Justice cannot be served if a 
detective is allowed to lie to obtain a warrant, and then lie to 
make sure his illegally seized evidence is admitted. That type of 
conduct is as illegal as the crimes the appellant was convicted of. 
In Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court held that, 
,tT,he interest of the United otates in a criminal prosecution, is 
not that it shall win the case, but that justice will be done." 
Is T'tahfs interest any different ? Does the Ltate want to win at 
any cost, so long as it wins 9 In Donnelly v. )eChristofana, 416 
U.S. 637 (1974), the Court stated, "The function of the prosecutor 
under the federal constitution is not to tack as many skins of 
victims to the wall. His function is to vindicate the rights of 
the people expressed in the laws and give those accused of a 
crime a fair trial.11 
Is a trial fair wnen a detective lies to get illegally seized 
evidence admitted ? Is the process fair when the defendants right 
under the Sixth Amendment, to effective assistance of counsel is 
denied ? Is the sentencing process fair when a judge refuses to 
consider mitigating evidence ? The appellant does not believe that 
fundamental fairness exists when these facts are present. The facts 
articulated in the petition, supported by Ms. Wells affidavit and 
the record itself warranted an evidentiary hearing. Those facts 
sufficiently show that both good cause and unusual circumstances 
exist. Judge Frederick1 holding that the petition is frivilous is 
without basis, and flies in the face of the decisions cited above. 
Especially those decisions cited from this Court. The appellant has 
shown that the petition warrants an evidentiary nearing, and if the 
facts are proven, he should be granted habeas corpus relief. 
WHEREFORE the appellant prays that this Court will reverse 
the order of the district Court, and remand this matter back for 
an evidentiary hearing. 
lA^D this day of September 1992 
WILLIAM K. BABBEL 
Pro Se 
P.O. Box 250 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
WILLIAM H. 3ABBEL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
M. TAMARA HOLDEN, 
R e s p o n d e n t . 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
NO. fytftttM. //O Case 
... 000O000 v££W^ ? F^"-:^ ^.^.-^-^^ 
COMES NOW the petitioner, William E. Babbel, and piirsu'ant>,ta,v''v^ 
Rule 65B (b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for cause of action 
states and alleges; 
'1. That he is the petitioner in the above-entitled action. 
2. That M. Tamara Holden is the Warden of the Utah State Prison 
and currently has custody of the petitioner. 
3# That this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as 
is enumerated in Title 78-3-4 (1), and (2), of the Utah Code Ann, 
4. That the statute of limitations enumerated in Title 78-12-
31.1, of the Utah Code Ann, are not applicable in the instant case, 
as the petitioner was tried and convicted prior to the enactment 
of the above statute. Any application,; of the statute of limitations 
in this matter would be an ex post facto application of the law. 
(See Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990).) 
5. The petitioners conviction was entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
in CR-85-843. The Honorable Scott Daniels presiding. 
6. The petitioner was found guilty of three counts, and 
not guilty of one count. Guilty on two counts of aggravated 
sexual assault, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. Not 
guilty of aggravated robbery. 
7. The petitioner was found guilty after trial by jury. 
8. The petitioner pleaded not guilty. 
9. The petitioner was found guilty after a two day trial on 
28 October 1985. 
10. The petitioner did not testify at trial. 
11. The petitioner appealed the conviction to the Utah 
Supreme Court.
 h 
12. The Court upheld the conviction and issued their decision i v / 
on 3 March 1989. - V^  .iY/ 
13. The grounds raised on appeal were; that the evidence 0\ 
seized and used at trial was seized illegally, and that without 
the ilegally seized evidence, the evidence at trial would have 
been insufficient to sustain the verdict. The decision of the 
Court is cited as State v. Babbel, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989), and 
is attached as Exhibit A. 
« 
14# Cn appeal, the Court vacated the petitioners sentences 
and ordered him resentenced, because, the trial court had failed 
to impose sentences that complied with the required minimum/ 
mandatory time frame, 
15. The petitioner appealed the new harsher sentences as 
violating the double jeopardy clause. The Court found no merit 
in that argument and upheld the sentences in State v. Babbel, 
813 P.2d , (Utah 1991). The petitioner filed a timely petition 
for re-hearing alleging that the trial court had refused to consider 
evidence in mitigation* The Court denied rehearing. 
l6#The petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari 
in the United States Supreme Court. Cert, was denied. 3abbe1 v. 
Utah, ' 'U.S. (1992) 
17. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
in this Court in December 1990. (910900585HC)• This petition was 
denied by Judge David Young on or about 20 June 1991. The petition 
alleged ineffectiveness of counsel during plea discussions. 
That matter is on appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
18. The issues presented in this petition were not presented 
previously because the petitioners trial counsel had the transcripts, 
and the petitioner could not gain access to them. Only after the 
petition was filed did the petitioner receive the transcripts. 
This issue could not have been discovered without the transcripts 
of the trial and the supression hearings. 
3. 
19. The above petition was brought because the petitioners 
counsel on appeal would not bring ineffective assistance of 
counsel allegations against his trial counsel Brooke C. Wells. 
20. The petitioners counsel on appeal at that time was Joan 
Watt of the Legal Defenders Association. A colleague of Ms. Wells. 
After the petition was filed, Ms. Watt withdrew as counsel on 
appeal. Mr. Walter Bugden than appeared as counsel. 
21. The petitioner was represented by Brooke C. Wells in all 
of the motion hearings and at trial in this matter, as well the 
first appeal. 
22. The petitioner was represented by Joan C. Watt on the 
second appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
23. The petitioner was represented by Robert D. Pusey at 
the evidentiary hearing on the previous petition. 
24* The petitioner brought the appeal on the petition as 
well as the petition for writ of certiorari pro~se. 
25 • The petitioners restraint is illegal and unlawful in 
that the evidence used at- trial was illegally seized pursuant to 
a warrant which was gained by perjured testimony.of Larry Cazier. 
26. The evidence illegally seized was admitted at trial by 
use of perjured testimony of Detective Larry Cazier. 
27. The petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel 
during the supression hearing on the illegally seized evidence, 
and on appeal. 
28. The petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel 
on appeal when Ms* watt refused to raise ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. 
29. FACTS: 
On 22 April 1985, Det. Larry Cazier went to the petitioners home 
in West Jordan. After discussion with the petitioners family, the 
detective made threats to the effect that the petitioner would be 
shot and questions asked later. After the threats were made, the 
detective was allowed to look into the petitioners _vtruck. After 
looking into the bed and cab of the truck, the detective went to, 
then, Deputy County Attorney Barbara Bearnson, who prepared an 
affidavit and search warrant. In the affidavit in support of the 
warrant, the detective relied on three paragraphs to find sufficient 
probable cause to issue the warrant. See attached copy of affidavit 
and warrant in Exhibit B. The first two paragraphs recounted the 
descriptions of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction. The 
third paragraph was information told to the detective by another 
detective. 
It should be noted, that on appeal, the State stipulated that 
the third paragraph, containing information of Detective Virgil 
Johnson, should not be considered when reviewing the sufficiency 
of the affidavit. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. See Babbel I 
770 P.2d 992 foot note 2. 
Once that paragraph is removed, the only statements left to 
find probable cause are the two paragraphs describing the truck. 
The f i r s t paragraph relates the victims description of the 
vehicle, 
"Karen Sine described the interior of the 
vehicle as having orange seat covers, a 
cracked windshield, beverage holders on 
the dashboard, a 55 *np& sucks button on 
the driverside-visor, and a cassette 
player in the dashboard," 
The detective stated that the truck "matched11 that description. 
During the suppression hearing the detective testified that the 
victim described the truck as having orange seat covers, in response 
to a question by Ms. Wells. Supression Hearing transcripts at 
page 51. 
On page 44 of the same transcripts the detective testified in 
response to the following question; 
Q. "All right. And you swore to Judge Burton at the time the 
information contained in that probable cause statement was true 
and correct to t he best of your knowledge; isn't that right;? 
A. "Yes I did." 
The following exchange took place at pg. 51 of the suppression 
hearing transcripts. 
Q. "Your reports indicate that Karen Sine had described the 
interior of the truck as having orange seat covers or portions of 
cushions; isn't that right ? 
A. "Correct." 
6. 
At trial during questioning by Mr. Vuyk, the following exchange 
took place; 
Q. "Tell me what she said about the interior. 
A. "She recalled that the front seat was what she referred to 
as orange spongy material. She described two drink holders that 
were mounted on the dash." T.T. at 207 
But when the detective was confronted with his own reports, 
he changed that testimony. 
Q. (By Ms. Wells) And in that report you describe the description 
given to you as not having orange seats right ? 
A. Well - -
Q# You donft describe it as having orange seats do you ? 
A. Well, lets compare reports. 
Q# If you111 look at page four of your report. 
A. I'm on page 4. 
Q# On the third paragraph approximately the seventh line down, 
you've described there what her description of the interior looks 
like, donft you ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there you don't say anything about orange seat covers 
do you ? 
A. No. She said white— 
Q. • . • you do say something about white seat covers ? 
A. Thats correct. 
Q. And you d o n ' t say anything about yellow sea t covers a t a l l , do 
you ? 
A. It says white. 
See trial transcripts at 222, 223. 
The detective also stated that the truck had drink holders 
of the wire type mounted on the dash. But during cross examination 
by Ms. Wells the detective testified that he did not have the 
drink holders. The detective had pictures taken of the truck, just 
as he saw it on the day the search was conducted* See T.T. at 211. 
Deputy Bruce Clemins took the pictures:£hat were- -to ^become-States 
Exhibits S-1, S-3, and S-4. 
During cross examination Karen Sine made the following 
responses to questions by Ms* Wells. T.T. at 183. 
Q# Now let me show you whats been marked as States Exhibit S-3. 
Q. Now, in that picture you don't see any cassette tapes, do you ? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't see any drink holders, do you ? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't see any type cord hanging down, do you ? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't see any beer bottles, do you ? 
The detectives own testimony and the pictures he had taken 
establish that the truck did not match the description given by 
the victim. His own testimony that his reports indicated that the 
victim described the truck as having orange spongy seats, is later 
contradicted when confronted with the reports. The report states 
"white spongy material like s tyro foam11. See attached report in 
Exhibit C. The detective made £alse statements in the affidavit 
in support of the warrant. Further he compounded this perjury by 
re-stating it in court, and only corrected himself when confronted 
with his reports. The truck did not match the description given 
by the victim. It did not have drink holders on the dash, the 
seats were yellow and black, not orange and not white as he had 
memorialized in his reports. No evidence was ever introduced to 
establish that the truck had a broken windshield, and the 55 niph 
sucks button was never mention in any report. Additionally, the 
victim, Karen Sine did not mention the button in a 26 page recorded 
statement, at the preliminary hearing, or in the written report 
made by the detective. She only "rembered the button'1 when the 
detective showed it to her on the day of trial and showed her a 
photograph of where it was in the truck. The detective stated that 
the button was mentioned.in his field notes but refused to turn the 
notes over to either the defense or the State. See S.H. at 47, and 
T.T. at 231. 
The transcripts referred to in this petition are included 
in this petition as Exhibit D. 
The truck did not match the description given by the victim 
to the detective. In swearing that the truck matched the victims 
description, the detective perjured himself. This perjury was 
compounded by Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Tom Vuyk during 
trial, Mr. Vuyk having read the reports and knowing that the 
report stated "white spongy" seats asked the detective what color 
she stated and then did nothing when the detective comitted perjury 
again. T.T. at 207. 
Without that one paragraph, the Utah Supreme Court would have 
most probably struck down the warrant. See Babbel I, 992, and 992 
footnote 3. The Court held that the affidavit was very poor and it 
was a "very close question". 
30. FACTS: 
Petitioners counsel, Brooke C. Wells, was given the police reports 
and witness statements three months prior to the :supression 
hearing before Judge Daniels. Counsel had several weeks to read 
and look over the reports. Additionally, the petitioner told her 
during several meetings that the truck did not have white seats, 
as the reports indicated. Counsel knew that the reports stated 
white seats. However, counsel did not raise the discrepencies in 
the reports until the time of trial. After the illegally seized 
evidence had been admitted. Had counsel used the reports at the 
supression hearing, and shown that the truck did not match the 
descriptions, the evidence probably would not have been admitted. 
Further, if counsel would have shown that the detective used such 
false information in the affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court would 
10. 
probably have ruled differently than they did. Counsel's failure 
to use the reports at the supression hearing fell below the 
standard of performance expected „f trial counsel. Additionally, 
because the Court found the affidavit so lacking, there is a very 
likely probability that the warrant would have been struck down 
on appeal, if not at trial. Because one of the two paragraphs 
used to establish probable cause contained false information, 
the affidavit and warrant would have failed. 
Counsel did use the reports at trial, but the evidence was already 
before the jury. Even after showing that the detective used false 
information, counsel did not raise it before the Utah Supreme Court. 
Had counsel shown that the truck did not match, as the detective 
stated in the affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court would have ruled 
differently than they did. 
31. FACTS: 
After the petitioner was resentenced, he appealed the new sentences 
pro se. After failing to get case law from the contract firm at 
the prison, the petitioner moved for appointment of counsel. 
Specifically stating that he did not want anyone fron the Legal 
Defenders Association appointed because of ineffectiveness of 
counsel. The court appointed Joan ,vratt anyway. See Exhibit E to 
this petition. The petitioner requested Ms. tfatt to review the 
brief filed and asked if ineffective assistance of counsel could 
be raised. Ks. tfatt indicated that she could not raise any issue 
against Ms. Wells. 
11. 
52. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
consider the mitigating circumstances presented by the petitioner 
and authorized by U.C.A. 76-3-201(5)(c). 
FACTS* In Babbel I, the Utah Supreme Court vacated the 
petitioner's original sentences because they did not conform to the 
statutory punishments for the offenses for which he was convicted. 
The sentences first imposed were illegal because the trial court 
treated the convictions as if they were ordinary first degree 
felonies, rather than first degree felonies subject to minimum/ 
mandatory sentences. Based upon the mandate of U.C.A. 77-35-22(e), 
(supp# 1981), the Supreme Court directed the petitioner be re-
sentenced. 
At the time of the re-sentencing on March 24, 1989* the 
petitioner had been incarcerated nearly fourt years. During the 
period of his incarceration at the Utah State Prison, the petitioner 
availed himself of many treatment and rehabilitation programs 
offered by the Department of Corrections. These counseling programs 
included the Intermountain-Sexual Abuse Treatment (I.S.A.T.) and a 
Southwest Utah Mental Health program. Additionally, the petitioner 
received no disciplinary write-ups while housed at the Utah State 
Prison. 
In eschewing this mitigation evidence, the trial judge did not 
rule that the evidence failed to justify imposing the lowest term 
of severity. Instead, the trial court made the threshold decision 
to not even consider the proffered evidence. The judge erroneously 
believed that he was constrained to consider aggravation and 
mitigation in the context of only the crime* The trial court 
elaborated on this reasoning by stating, "I'm really talking about 
the facts of the crime itself." (3/24/89 Transcript, pg. 13) 
Yet nothing in the governing statute requires such a limitation 
on the evidence. In fact the statute states ; 
In determining whether there are circumstances 
that justify imposition of the highest or 
lowest term, the court may consider the record 
in the case, the probation officers report, 
other reports, including reports received 
under section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation 
or mitigation submitted by the prosecution 
or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
U.C.A. 76-3-201-(5)(c) 
In refusing to consider evidence presented by the petitioner, 
the trial court abused itfs discretion. 
33. Petitioners current sentences are illegal in that the 
trial court went beyond the meaning of Rule 22 (e)f U.R.Cr.P. 
FACTS: In Babbel I. the Supreme Court ordered the petitioner 
resentenced because the sentences imposed by the trial court failed 
to comply with the minimum/mandatory time scheme. When the trial 
court corrected the sentences, it should have only corrected the 
portion of the sentence that was illegal. That being, that the 
court failed to impose the minimum/mandatory term, and did not 
state itfs reasons for the sentence given on the record. The original 
terms iiaposed by the trial court were legal sentences and should 
not have been increased. See Babbel II, page two, footnote 1. 
(Babbel II is attached to the petition as Exhibit A) 
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34# Deputy County Attorney Tom Vuyk knowingly used and relied 
on false testimony to secure use of illegally seized evidence. 
FACTS: Prior to trial Dpty Co. Atty Vuyk had possession of 
all the official police reports in this matter. He knew that the 
reports stated that the victim identified the color of the truck 
seats as white. Not orange. Additionally, Tom Vuyk knew that the 
photos taken of the truck clearly showed that the truck did not 
have white seats, or beverage holders on the dash. Despite these 
established facts, Vuyk allowed the testimony of Det. Cazier, to 
the effect that the truck matched as to those descriptions to remain 
in the record at the supression hearing. Vuyk relied and used this 
testimony in his argument to the court, not to supress the evidence 
illegally seized. The photos mention above are the States exhibits 
used at the supression hearing, and at trial. As previously stated, 
these photos clearly show that the truck did not match. This is 
cooborated by the victims testimony, attached as an exhibit to this 
petition. Tom Vuyk knew that the reports did not state "orange seats". 
Tom Vuyk knew that the truck did not have beverage holders in it, 
as the affidavit in support of the warrant stated. But he did 
nothing to correct this mis-information presented to the court at 
the supression hearing. Had it been shown that the affidavit had 
false information in it, it is possible that the outcome would have 
been different. Tom Vuyk intentionally let false testimony into 
the record at the supression hearing and relied on it to gain the 
admission of illegally seized evidence. 
U . 
35. Deputy County Attorney Tom Vuyk with-held documents after 
he was served with a motion to discover evidence he intended to use 
at trial. 
FACTS: During the preliminary hearing, counsel for the petitioner 
filed a motion to-discover evidence* To include all police reports, 
statements, ect. The State turned over most, but not all of the 
documents sought by counsel. 
In the affidavit in support of the warrant, Cazier made a 
reference to a stick pin button, which had "55 M.P.H. Sucks", printed 
on it. Stating that the victim described the button. But in a very 
detailed statement, 26 pages, the victim never mentions the button. 
Nor is it mentioned in any report that Cazier prepared. When asked 
about the truck at preliminary, the victim never mentions the button. 
The victim did, however, recall the button on the day of trial, but 
only after Cazier had shown it to her, and told her where it was in 
the truck. 
During trial, and the supression hearing, the detective testified 
from his personal notes. Which, according to Cazier, was the only 
place that the buttoned was mentioned. While on the stand the det-
ective used the notes to refresh his memory, and then give testimony. 
But, after using those notes to secure illegally seized evidence, 
and to give testimony, the State never turned those notes over to 
the petitioner or his counsel. Those notes were crucial to the case 
presented by the State. But the defense was not given copies for 
impeachment purposes. 
Because those notes were the only place, allegedly, that any type 
reference was made to the button, those notes should have been made 
available to the defense. Especially when the detective used them 
on the witness stand. 
The petitioner was denied crucial material after a motion for 
discovery was filed. The State's attorney intentionally with-held 
those notes from the defense, because, the petitioner believes, they 
would show that the descriptions given by the victim were in fact 
different from those Cazier used in the affidavit, 
36. Counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an order from 
the court requiring that those notes be turned over. 
37. The intrusion onto the property known as 8558 South 3830 
West, West Jordan, Utah was illegal, and the subsequent visual 
search of the petitioners truck violated the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Consitution, 
PACTS: On 22 April, 1985, Det. Cazier went to the petitioners 
home and requested to see the petitioner* Identifying himself only 
ffas a friend of Bills". After being told that the petitioner was 
not at home, the detective went across the street and held sack on 
the home. After surveilling the home for several hours, the detective 
returned. He told the petitioners mother that the petitioner was 
wanted, and that he wanted to search the petitioners truck, Cazier 
was told that he could not search the truck. He stated to petitioner's 
mother, that the petitioner was armed and dangerous and would be 
shot on sight. He was then allowed to look into the truck. 
After looking into the truck and making notes of the contents, 
Cazier sought a warrant. But even after looking into the truck, 
he did not put factual information into the affidavit. The initial 
intrusion into the property and the subsequent looking into the 
truck are violative of the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. 
First, Cazier used threats and coercion to gain access to the truck 
to gain information he could not have otherwise have gotten. The 
truck could not be seen from the street, (the interior, or the bed), 
nor could it be seen from the walk to the house from the street. 
And as if by coincedence, the stick pin button first appeared in 
written form right after the illegal intrusion. 
Second, the petitioner was the registered owner of the truck. No 
other person used or had access to the use of the truck. The 
petitioners mother was not an owner or user of the vehicle, and 
could not give permission for the police to look into the truck. 
After making the threats to petitioners mother, Cazier did not tell 
her that she did not have to let him look into the truck. He left 
her with the impression that the petitioner would be shot on sight 
if he was not allowed to look into the vehicle. 
After looking at the truck, Cazier sought a warrant. Knowing that 
the truck did not match the descriptions given by the victim, Cazier 
intentionally supplied false information to the court to gain the 
warrant. The seats did not match, no drink holders, and no crack 
in the windshield. And tye button only became noticed after the 
illegal intrusion. 
17. 
38. The seizure of the stick pin button violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
FACTS: The stick pin button was not an item to be seized in 
the body of the warrant. It only appears in the affidavit in support 
of the warrant. Cazier swore, under oath, that the victim had 
described the button. But in a detailed 26 page statement, where 
the victim recalled items as small as a piece of tape on the dash, 
she never described the button. She described gauges, tapes, papers 
mirrors, and cords, but never mentions the button. Nor does the 
button appear in any other report. The victim did not recall it 
in her statement,at preliminary hearing, and only recalled it at 
trial, when Cazier showed it to her before she testified. 
The button only appeared after Cazier used threats to gain access 
to petitioners truck. During the supression hearing Cazier made 
admissions to the effect he had mentioned he might have to use force 
in arresting the petitioner. (See supression hearing transcripts in 
Exhibit F) 
39. The petitioner filed a petition in the U.S. District Court, 
for the District of Utah on or about 15 May 1992. The Magistrate 
filed his Report and Recommendation on 21 May 1992. In part 
Magistrate Boyce stated that these issues have not been previously 
presented to any Utah Court, and therefore, the petitioner must 
go back, and let a Utah Court have -the opportunity to rule on the 
issues presented. The federal petition alleged the same facts as 
are alleged in this petition. The federal order states; The petitioner 
still has state habeas corpus relief available to him on his claims. 
547 (Utah 1989); Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). This 
Court cannot say that remedy is still not available, especially 
where petitioner asserts in his petition that counsel who represented 
him at various stages refused to raise the issue of incompetency 
of counsel. See discussion State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 
199D-" 
Because of the Federal Court's ruling, in this matter, the petitioner 
brings this petition to exaust his available state remedies. 
40. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the federal 
petition without prejudice on 27 May 1992. There are no other 
existing petitions presently before any court, in this matter. 
41. The facts as stated above violated the petitioners right 
to a fair trial, appeal, and to the effective assistance of counsel. 
42. The facts as stated above violated the petitioners rights 
as are guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and his Article I, 
sections 7, 11, 12, and 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, because the petitioners conviction was gained by the 
use of false testimony, and he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel at all stages of the preceedings, the petitioner prays that 
this Court will hold a hearing, at which time the petitioner may 
be represented by counsel, and decide this matter on the facts, 
and the merits. And, if proven to be a true and correct recital of 
the facts, issue a writ freeing the petitioner from his illegal 
custody. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May 1992. 
'William H. Babbel 
Pursuant to the penalty for perjury enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 
section 1746, I declare that the foregoing facts alleged in this 
petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
.lliam H. Babbel 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)538-10 21 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM H. BABBELL, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Petitioner, : BROOKE C. WELLS 
v. : 
HOLDEN, TAMARAM., Warden, : Case No. 920903226 HC 
Utah State Prison, 
: Judge J- DENNIS FREDERICK 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW Brooke C. Wells, affiant, and hereby deposes, 
states and swears under oath that: 
1. She is an attorney licensed to practice under the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
2. She represented petitioner William H. Babbell 
before the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
wherein Mr. Babbell was convicted of two counts of aggravated 
sexual assualt ..and one count of aggravated kidnapping, in all 
pretrial proceedings in that Court, and in Mr. Babbell's appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court, wherein his convictions were affirmed 
in State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989). 
3. In the course of this affiant's preparing for 
trial, Mr. Babbell was an active participant in assisting in the 
preparation of his own defense, including the preparation of 
research memoranda in support of the motion to suppress, directed 
at excluding evidence obtained in a search of his vehicle. 
Attached are two letters received by this affiant from Mr, 
Babbell evidending such assistance. In the letter dated November 
11, 1985, Mr. Babbell notes discrepancies in the testimony of Ms, 
Sine and Officer Cazier concerning the color of the truck. In 
the letter of September 14, Mr. Babbell again notes the 
discrepancy in witness testimony concerning the color of the 
truck and, further, congratulates me on my performance in dealing 
with Officer Cazier. 
4. Petitioner was also an active participant in the 
preparation of his appeal, evidenced by the attached letter of 
February 6, 1986, to Jeffrey Hunt, a clerk who assisted this 
affiant in the preparation of Mr. Babbell's appeal. In this 
letter Mr. Babbell specifically notes issues for appeal, 
including Officer Cazeer's [sic] alleged perjured testimony 
during the evidentiary hearing, the refusal of the County 
Attorney's Office to supply allegedly favorable evidence to the 
defense (Officer Cazier's notes) and allegedly misleading 
comments by Mr. Vuyk in closing argument. 
5. Affiant supplied Mr. Babbell with all transcripts 
requested by Mr. Babbell at all stages of preparation prior to 
trial and appeal, including transcripts of the motion to suppress 
and trial. Mr. Babbell again requested copies of the preliminary 
hearing and police reports only in the last six weeks, although 
it is my firm belief that he had access to these documents 
throughout the proceedings, considering his active assistance in 
preparing his defense. 
6. Based on the discovery provided to me by the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, I never believed that there 
existed firm grounds for claiming that Officer Cazier had 
perjured himself, but rather that he had made mistakes subjecting 
him to attacks on his credibility. 
7. In January, 1990, Salt Lake Legal Defender sent to 
Mr. Babbell transcripts of the motion to suppress and the trial, 
which to date he had not returned. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 1992. 
^ytilf 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss 
pH-> 
day of July, 1992, before me, On this the 
IdPicr'd fa t(i , the undersigned officer, personally appeared 
BROOKE C. WELLS, known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within affidavit and acknowledged that she 
executed the same for the purpose therein contained. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah, 84116 
Febuary 6 1986 
Dear Mr, Hunt, 
Thank you for your letter letting me know that you 
are doing my appeal. In regard to whether or not I have anything 
that I want to include, yes there are some areas that I have ques-
tions about. These areas are as follows; 
1. Knowing use of perjured testimony by Detective Cazeer during the 
evidentiary hearing, and in his affidavit in support of the wa-
rrant. 
2. Illegally seized evidence. 
3. Failure of the prosecution to inform the defence of evidence 
that was favorable to our case. 
4. Inconsistent testimony by the victim during all phases of the 
proceedings. 
5. Violation of the exclusionary rule by Cazeer during the trial. 
And of course the misleading comments made by Vuyk during his 
closing remarks. 
First I will address the perjury by Cazeer. In his affidavit 
he stated that the description he was going by when he searched 
my truck was given to him by Ms. Sine. He also states this in the 
transcripts of the evidentiary hearing. However, during the trial 
while making reference to notes, that he refused to let Brooke look 
at, he stated "she said that the truck was Tan. with a White interior, 
until I showed her pictures of the defendants truck". Now this 
being the case, and a matter of record, it is obvious that Cazeer 
either lied during the trial, or more likely he lied in his affidavit 
and the evidentiary hearing. This matter is in itself a reversable 
error. 
Next I find that the evidence was admitted by means of 
deceit and of course knowing perjury by Cazeer. Along with all the 
other abuse of authority Cazeer used in gaining the warrant I think 
that the fact he lied abotie the description of the truck involved 
in itself is an error. 
If in fact Ms. Sine did not describe my truck and did in 
fact describe a tan truck with a white interior then it is more than 
obvious that he lied. Next the issue of the photo identification he 
testified to during the trial. Cazeer stated in court that he had 
shown photos to Sine the day after the search, however Sine stated 
in court and during the preliminary that she was shown photos on 
the day of her recorded statemnet and then again two weeks after 
the search, not on the 23rd of April. If you look at Cazeer's testimony 
you will see that he stated that he only showed Sine one set of photos. 
But if you read the preliminary hearing and the trial, you will find 
that Sine said she was shown books on the 19th and pictures two weeks 
after. 
If the field notes that Cazeer were shown to Vuyk, then he 
knew that Sine said the truck that was used in the abduction was tan 
with a white interior, if that is the case, he knew that Cazeer had 
lied during the evidentiary hearing and on the affidavit. If he did 
in fact know this and with held that information he was in violation 
of the Utah Code. I further believe that he knew Cazeer had shown 
Sine the evidence on the day of the trial. That in itself is a 
violation of the exclusionary rule that was invoked by Judge Daniels 
at the beginning of the trial... 
I need to add to the point of Cazeer lying about the description of 
the truck. HE COULD NOT HAVE SHOWN SINE ANY PICTURES OF THE TRUCK 
BEFORE HE CONDUCTED THE SEARCH. The showing of pictures of the truck 
had to have happened after the search, he then was proceeding under 
the description of a tan truck with a white interior. The fact the 
interior mentioned was white is documented in Cazeer's report dated 
April 19 1985. It is also mentioned that he did not contact Sine on 
the day of the search. He was then proceeding under his own con-
clusion that the truck was in fact the truck he wanted. This is 
a violation of the rules of evidence, in as much as a showing of 
probable cause needs to be made other than the officers "belief" 
that the evidence is there. 
The next point that I have found and backed up with Case Law is 
in the area of Cazeer not allowing Brooke to look at his field notes. 
Cazeer used those notes to refresh his memory while on the stand 
and by law we had the right to look at those writings before he did 
use them. I believe that Brooke included them in the suimons she 
issued for the evidentiary hearing. However they were never produced. 
The case law in this matter is at the end of this letter. 
The inconsistent testimony that Sine gave during the trial 
was so obvious that it should have been suppressed by the Judge. 
Some of the areas that were inconsistent were abotu a mustache, 
the color of the seat in the truck, the knife the gun, and description 
of the truck. In Cazeers report of the 19th it states that the victim 
said "he had no mustache and the color of the seat was white", there is 
something about sunglasses and bald spots on the assailants head also. 
During the preliminary Sine stated that she could not remember any 
color in the truck, this is in the transcripts, and that the man had 
a mustache. She also stated that I had dyed my hair, but during the 
trial she said that it was the same as on the night of the crime. 
During the trial she stated that she had made all those inconsistent 
statements. 
The fact that Cazeer violated the exclusionary rule is 
in the transcripts of the trial. Sine admitted that Cazeer had shown 
her the evidence on the day of the trial. This came when she made 
a comment about the '55 M.P.H. SUCKS'1 button that she had failed to 
identify any where prior to the trial. That button is not mentioned 
in any of her statments nor during the preliminary hearing. In fact 
at the pre-lim she was asked to recall any specif identifying mark 
in the interior of the truck, she was unable to do this. It seems 
obvious that she did not know of it's existence until Cazeer had 
shown it ot her on the day of the trial. I will include the case law 
that I have found in some of these areas, most of it has been sent 
to Brooke already, but I will send it to you again. Thank You for 




1 I C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 
3 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
4
 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 
6| I, Susan S. Sprouse, hereby certify that I am 
7 a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State cf Utah; that 
8 as such Certified Shorthand Reporter, I attended the hear-
9 J ing of the above-mentioned matter at that time and place 
10 I set out herein; that thereat I took down in shorthand the 
11 testimony given and the proceedings had therein; and that 
12 thereafter I transcribed my said shorthand notes into type-
13 writing, *and that the foregoing transcription is a full, 
14 true, and correct transcription of the same. 




Susan S. Sprouse, £.S.R., R.P.R. 
My Commission Expires: 
19 /Vou • / °[ f'7 







IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
): ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Micheal Burton 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he \r-s reason to believe 
That fX) in the vehicle(s) described as 19"7! Chevrolet pickup 
truck, License £MK31Z7, dark brown in color 
[\) on the premises known as 5 5 3 S South 3830 West with a 
white camper located in the driveway; and the house at 
the same address, a white and brown mobile home which 
is not presently mobile 
In the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain propertv or evidence described as: 
1. Small revolver, snub-nose type 
2. Hunting knife, with approximately 6M blade 
3. Wondra Lotion 
4. Large black flashlight 
5. Wallet, maroon in color, velcro fastner, containing credit cards 
and identification of Karen Sine 
6. Clothing consisting of white short-sleeved O.P. Brand T-shirt, 
blue baseball cap 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the propertv and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Aggravated Sexual Assault, Aggravated 
Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery. 
-Tr 1 T-v\ I * FOR SEARCH r. A\r.-.' 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
lour affiant, Detective Larry Ca:ier, Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office, has been employed by the Sheriff's Office for thirteen years 
and has been assigned to the Sex Crimes Unit for two years, and 
bases this request for a search warrant upon the following: 
1) A statement by Karen Sine that on April 18, 1985, at about 5:00 
a.m. she was in Millcreek Canvor. with 3 other individuals when she 
was approached bv a person who identified himself as a narcotics 
officer and asked her to come with him. Once inside his vehicle, 
she was taken to a different location where she was sexually 
assaulted and was deprived of her wallet by the suspect. 
as having orange 
holders on the 
side visor, and a 
Th?_-1 Pther individuals who saw __th e vietj.m__ l_e_aye with the suspect, 
Lisa Jenkins, Jack Moyer, and Alfonso Ulibarri, describe _the truck 
as a" older model Chevrolet 4-wheel _djiv_e pick-up, dark brown in 
col_or, with no front or rear bumpers. 
Based on the modus operadi of the suspect and the description of the 
suspect, Det. Virgil Johnson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, 
believed the vehicle may belong to William Babbel. The detectives 
drove by the address of the suspect, 8558 South 5830 Kest, and 
noticed a truck in the dri veway that matched__t_he__jlescription. The 
suspect's mother, a FesTdent a! the address, gave the ""detectives 
permission to look at the truck. — 
The suspect's mother stated that the suspect resides both in the 
camper located in the driveway and inside the residence previously 
desc ri bed. 
The victim, Karen Sine, reports that luring sex acts forced upon her 
by the suspect, he used Wondra lotion, which he obtained from the 
glove box. She also described a___6_M___ hunting knife, and a small 
revolver, the both of which ~ suspect placed behind the seat of the 
pickup truck. She further described his clothing as being a white 
sh(^ rt_^ sle_e,ved_ J3.,?_. _brand T-Shirt "and" as him having wore a blue 
baseball cap. She also"""s t a t ed tne "susreci deprived her of her 
r. a roorT" wallet" " Vi th a velcro fastener, containing her identification 
and credit cards. The suspect used a large black police-type 
flashlight during the commission of the offenses. 
Karen Sine described the interior of the vehicle 
seat covers, a jc racked windshielf, beverage 
dashboard, _a__J153_mpJti_s_ucks.M button on the_d_ri_ve_i^ _s 
cassette play'er in the dashboard. 
i- -> \ i * r V.M. ^ ^ ^ 7 
. n r\ n J\ :\ n. > i 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items: 
(X) in the day time. 
SUESCRIEED AKD SWORN TO EEFORE ME this ^ ' d a y of April, 1965 
%(^k 
JUDQE 
IK TH"E FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, IN AKD 




 i A That *s not i r u e . 
! 
2
 | Q Nothing t h a t ' s a r t i c u l a t e d w i th in the body of 
3 {
 th is a f f idav i t , is there? 
4 I ! 
A We had a case filed that we-- ; 
5
 ! Q If you'll answer my question. Is there anything 
c j 
I listed within the body of this affidavit which states that 
you would have independently corroborated what Virgil Johnson 
8
 J may have told you, even though we don't know what Virgil 
9
 | Johnson told you? 
i 
10
 ! A You're asking me is my independent corroboration--
Q I'm asking you what is stated in here. Is there 
anything stated within that, that corroborates what Virgil 
Johnson may have told you, whatever that may be? 

















describ^edj;the - i n t e r ^ 
i 
covers-vor ^portions ~of -cushions r^jLsiif t that -right? j 
A Correct. 
Q The interior of Mr. Babbell's truck does not 
have orange inside of it, does it? 
A Yes, it does. 
MS. WELLS: May I have those pictures back. 
23
 | Q (By Ms. Wells) Mr. Cazier, I'm asking you to 
look at Defendant's Exhibit D-3. What color do you see 
in there? Isn't it yellow? 
51 
[HI 'TTTFT: .1^.1 ::::.;. Tiu ran proceed. 
| i 
5 I T ; By "r. Vuyk ) Thank you, Tour Honor. WCU1.G ! 
6 :
 y-': •-::, ;s vha: she told you about -he vehicle itself? . 
7
 ; .-. :es. Frhe rerremberea it was a four-wheel drive i 
3 I w-*:h n ~ u^rrceTr: £ha described :r.e interior in some detail. 
9
 i 1- Tell re what she said about the interior. 
1 _ ! 
$ \ ;. Sh^.Tr:eoariedythat; the^frdhTt^seat was'.what sn^ i 
M ' referred tolas'-orange-spongy -'material. .She described Ttwo : 
12 j dr^Tc^TfioTder^^ She I 
• 3 i rerrerr.be r ?d— -he d e s c r i b e d t h e s h i f t i n g a r r a n a e m e n t . I t | 
I " , i 
14
 < was r.n automatiJ wit* a four-wheel drive shifter on tne \ 
| ! 
15| flour. She recalled a oroken windshield on the passenger's j 
16
 | side. She described a button tnat was mounted on the 
I ': 
•' \ anver ' s viscr . 
,3
 ! Q What iii that button say? lid she say? ! 
• " i 
13
 I A She s e a t e d i t was a 30 r u l e s per hour sucks i 
AJ
 ' b u t t e r . , 
! l 
21
 ] T What did sne say about :.VJ interior? « 
22
 I A She indicated it was quite cluttered. There i 
i 
*3 I were scr-.e beer cans in it, ;ust in general disarray. j 
24 | 
I nv : l u n a e l s e you c^n rettemoer i 
25


















That's ail I have. 
-.nytnmg further, Mr. Vuyk? 
Oh, Z thcugnt of one, I'm sorry. 
Go anead. 
is) Regarding the button that you 
, you took Ms. Sine's recorded statement, 
, I did. 
right. And have you had an opportunity to 
review that statement? 
A Yes. 
Q Nowhere in that statement did she ever describe 
a^55 mines'per'hour sucks button, did she, when asked to 
describe ' the^interior of the truck? 
A No, it's not on the recorded statement. 
MS. WELLS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Vuyk? 
MR. VUYK: Just one or two questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VUYK: 
Q Did Ms. Sine indicate to you at any time or in 
your conversation that there was a 55 miles per hour sucks 
button? 
A She did. 
Q Do you recall exactly when that was? 
229 
A Today. When I saw the button. 
Q Okay. No one said anything to you about it? 
A No. 
Q Larry didn't say anything to you about that? 
A No. He }ust said, "Have you ever seen these 
before", and I said, "Yes. Told him where they were." 
Q So, though, you have said that on the day that 
you were giving your recorded statement, you were giving 
an accurate statement as ~you could concerning the description 
of the person as well as the" truck,"" you left" this "out, ^ didn,11 
you? 
A I guess so. 
Q And - -it-didnJ-t~~you^didn f t ~_ remember i t ~whenJyou 
gaveTyouiTrecorded statement"ftHTd~*you? 
A ;N6'; 
Q And you"dicLn I t^remember l i t ItfherT^o'u Uere*"asked 
to give" d e t a i l e d accounts ^of -the ^ t r u c k _ a t _ t h e ^pr^^iminary 
hea r ing , did you? 
A No , 
Q Now, have you gotten to know Detective Cazier 
fairly well through this incident? 
A Just 'cause he's been by me, that's—you know. 
Q Standing by you in the sense supportive and that 
type of thing? 
A Yeah. And he's the one who's, you know, took 
169 
A That's correct . 
Q Now, officer, you made a report on the 19th of 
April, did you not? 
A Concerning this case? 
Q Yes. 
A I'm sure I did. 
Q All right. Let me show you what purports to 
"be y6ur;report of April 19th. Does that appear to'be your 
^report, ^ Officer? 
A Yes'7.•/•".!t...does . 
Q And it is dated April 19th, -.is it; not? 
A
 "It lis. 
" Q m lVnd^r t^~^a~f o^uir^page - repor t -? - / 
A Y e s . 
Q It looks to be a detailed report, does it not? 
A rl-T^ would'TjcalT'^ it :detailed/ yes ^  
Q Have you had an opportunity to review this report 
before coming in today? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q So you are familiar with -its contents, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And in preparing this report, you attempted to 
be as detailed and accurate as possible, did you not? 
A With the information available at that.time, 
yes. 
n -> i 
1
 Q And in this report, Detective Cazier, there is 
2 no mention of any 55 miles per hour sucks button, is there? 
3 A That's correct. 
4
 Q In this report ycu write the description given 
5 oy Karen Sine of the person //no assaulted her as being a 
6
 person without any mustache; isn't that true? 
7
 ' A That's correct. 
8 Q And in that -report you describe the description 
9 given to you of the interior of the truck not "as having 
10 orangeTseats , right? 
11 A tfell--
You don't describe it as having-orange seats, 
Well/^let ^ sjcompare "'reports: 
If you'll -look at-Page 4 *of your ^ report. 
IJ^ m±on Page^4_v 
On the third paragraph approximately the ^ seventh 
line 'down , you've described tnere what^ her description'of 
191
 the interior of that truck looks like, don't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And there you don'tsay anything about orange 
seat ^ covers, do you? 
23
 » A No. She said what--
24
 ' Q And you don't say anything about white seat— 
you do say something about white seat covers? 




















 I A That's correct. 
2; Q And you don't say anything about yellow, seat 
3;
 covers at all, do you? 
; A It says white. 
5
 S Q Now, you executed a search warrant in Mr, 
6! 3abbeil!s home and of the truck; is that right--
7


























that this particular truck had side mirrors on I 
t she? 
Yes, she did. 
All right. That hasn't been included in any 
of your aescriptions today, has it? 
A 
Q 
Not so far. 
Not in response to counsel's question to you 











My independent recollection, yes. ; 
All right . You ;have;-;no ;side^rnirrors-^tO; pr^esen^ 
evidence having .been f ound at_Mrr^Babbelljjs^house, 
No-;~zl .idp.inpt. .• 
You#xlon ' t _have_any. spotlightsv;to"'present :as 
J: od ay , 1. d o'; you? 
TNo, il do'not. 
223 
1
 ! Q You don't have any drink holders to present as , 
2! evidence, do you? 
3:
 A Not 'the holders themselves , no.-
!
 Q You don't have any, any beer bottles, do you? 
5
 J A It' s '"fairly obvious'"'1 don11 haveTbeer bottles . 
6
 ! Q Just as I ask you each question, please respond. 
i 
7
 s You don't have any--| 
8 i
 A T h a t ' s my r e s p o n s e , counse lo r . 
! 
y! Q You don 11.have any.cassette tapes to present, 

















A No7 'I do" not. 
Q You do, however, have a tee-shirt which you have 
described, "correct? 
A Yes. 
Q You've described Karen Sine as saying that this--
her assailant was a large framed individual, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Would you please look at that tee-shirt and tell 
me what size that is? 
A Well, it's got an M on it. If you'll allow me 
an assumption, I would say it's medium. 
Q Do you think a medium tee-shirt will fit a large 
framed man? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. 3abbell, would you stand, please take off 
??4 
A Virgil Johnson, Detective Skogg, and Sargent 
Carlson, and I believe there's one other, but I don't recall 
who it was or anything. 
Q Now, when you went there with that search warrant, 
did you have an opportunity to review the inside of the 
truck? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And were you p r e s e n t when p i c t u r e s were taken? 
A Yes. 
Q Who took, those pictures? 
A I had Officer Bruce Clemins. 
Q Ifm going to show you what's been marked as 
State ' s "Exhibit "S^ TT^ TS^ l', -s-4T "and ask you if you recognize 
those? 
A Yes. These are the pictures of the vehicle that 
were taken at the time we executed the search warrant. 
Q Now, when you executed the search warrant, were 
there license plates on that car? 
A Yes. There was one. That's depicted in the 
photograph on State's Exhibit S-l which is mounted on the 
left rear of the truck. 
Q Were there any license plates on the front of 
the truck? 
A There were not. 
Q Now, I'm going to show you what's been marked 
211 
•vhat inv -.".^cc lie ~M: ion is. 
C --'ha4: '^i:-=e did she say about the truck itself? 
A She r:escncec some : -ems thai were in the back 
or ]: he truck, in the bed of the trucK, those items being 
a rpare tire, sone auxiliary gas tanks, spare gas cans, 
and a eerier, drink cooler. 
Q Old she indicate anything about the color of 
the truck? 
A Yes. It was her impression at the time that 
it was a light color, that she didn't--
MS. T.\-£LLS: Objection. The question has been 
answered . 
Q 'By Mr. Vuyk) Anything else? 
IPJE COURT.. Sustained. 
Q [By Mr. Vuyk) --that she said about the tr^ck? 
A '\ithout referring to the notes, that's my 
r e c o 11 ec t ion > 
Q "•:;•/. did she also describe the individual to 
you? 
A She did. 
Q Van you tell me what her description was as oest 
vou reca 11? 
A Yes. She described him as being quite large 
frame., O'itk hair with giasses , fairly thick glasses. She 
described a tattoo on his arm, described his clothing, a 
?03 
A No. 
Q Was it light when you started walking down the 
canyon? 
A Yeah. 
Q Do you have any notion of when approximately 
you would have called your husband, what the time was? 
A He was already at work, and he gets to work at 
8:00, so I don't know. About 8:30 or so. I don't know. 
Q So somewhere between 8:00 and 8:30? 
A Yeah. 
Q And it took you approximately two hours to walk 
down? 
A - Yeah. I guess. _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Q Yesterday, Karen, I believe you described the 
inside of the car as being very dirty and messy, i-s that 
right? 
A Yes. 
Q And Cyoii "descr ibed " i t ^ a s T having'fdririkTholders 
insideT^is^thcitf^xight? 
A Yes. 
Q And you described jaight-track -tapes as being 
around? 
A Cassettes. 







 A Yes, 
2
 I Q And beer bottles on the floor? 
A Yes, 
Q And although you didn't mention it yesterday, 
5
 J haven't you previously indicated that the truck that you 
6
 J were in had some sort of a cord hanging down? 
A Yes. 
8
 I Q Now, let me show you again whatfs been marked 
9
 as State's Exhibit S-3.' Do you remember seeing that picture 
10 yesterday? 
" I A Yes. 
Q Now, in that picture, you.don11 .see any cassette 
jtype tapes^,^do you? 
A "TNo.-
Q You^ do^t^seerTany"Tcir ink ^ holders , ^ do_you? 
A No. 
Q Don*1 tTsee^ny^cdrd ~of ^ any .type" hanging idown,, 
.do you? 
A No. 
Q You don't see any beer bottles, do you? 
A No. 
MS. WELLS: Thank y o u . Your Honor , has S t a t e ' s 
E x h i b i t S-3 been i n t r o d u c e d ? 
THE COURT: I d o n ' t t h i n k i t w a s . 















1 A Yes. 
2 Q And you recall that you identified that picture 
3 as looking like, or in fact, being the truck that you saw 
4
 on the morning of the 17th and you were riding in it? 
5 A It looked like the boxes in the back. 
6 Q So you1re not identify the truck itself, but 
7 you're looking—you' re referring to what appears to be' boxes 
8 in the back? 
9 A Yeah. 
10 Q Is that correct? Though, that's the picture 
11 you've identified? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Now, in that particular picture, State's 13, 
14 there is no license plate shown in that picture, is there? 
15 A No. 
16 I Q And is that because the picture itself would 
cut off any license plate if it were there? 
MR. VUYK: I object. That's conjecture, Your 
19 Honor. She has no information as to when it might have 
20 been cut off. 
21 THE COURT: Sustained. 
22
 Q (By Ms. Wells) Looking at the picture, can you 
23 see the rear end of the truck? 
24
 A Not the very end. 
25
 Q Al l r i g h t . Let me, t hen , show you what ' s been 
17 
18 
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